1 April 2009

Commission on Safety Standards

Twenty-fourth Meeting

3-4 September 2008

IAEA Headquarters, Vienna

Report of the Meeting

1. Opening Session

1.1 Opening of the Meeting

Mr. Taniguchi opened the 24th meeting of the Commission on Safety Standards. He first thanked the CSS for its efforts in achieving wider interest in and use of the Safety Standards worldwide, as is observed today. He noted that the work and achievements of the Commission are vitally important elements for continuous improvements in the Global Nuclear Safety Regime, which in turn, support international efforts aimed at ensuring high levels of safety in mature nuclear programmes and those under consideration as ambitious new plans. The IAEA Safety Standards and their application, in particular the peer reviews and advisory services, at both national and international levels are essential components that support the harmonized implementation of other international instruments such as the Conventions on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention and the development of effective national safety infrastructures.

Mr Taniguchi then highlighted future challenges and opportunities in nuclear safety and security.

He noted that the nuclear community is currently faced with many new challenges in safety and security. As new nuclear power programmes emerge and existing programmes expand and mature, managing safety and security becomes a cornerstone of sustainable development. IAEA Safety Standards are among the key instruments for the sharing and application of knowledge among nuclear safety professionals worldwide. In order to prevent another serious nuclear accident or a terrorist incident, which, should it occur, would erase the high expectation of nuclear power development worldwide, new thinking is required with a new approach adapted to the dynamically changing global situations. For this reason Mr Taniguchi preferred to use the phrase 'vita nuova' rather than 'renaissance' which requires fresh insights, overcoming old mindsets and promoting modest but careful consideration rather than a simple revival of good old days. There is still significant room for further improvement of safety management and culture in order to better meet the newly expanding and increasingly complex challenges of nuclear development and safety.

In consideration of the future of the IAEA Safety Standards programme, he focussed the attention of the CSS on the recent report by the Commission of Eminent Persons on the future of the IAEA. This report contains many thought-provoking and important recommendations pertaining to the IAEA Safety Standards and their application. In particular, the Commission of Eminent Persons recommends that "over time states should enter into binding agreements to adhere to effective safety standards and to be subject to international peer reviews of nuclear safety." Mr Taniguchi noted that, although such a vision may seem like a very long term and difficult vision at this moment, the fresh insights and the overcoming of traditional mindsets would enable the Secretariat and the CSS to work together to reach higher levels of safety through improvements to the Global Nuclear Safety Regime, particularly in light of the need to support the rapidly expanding 'new entrant' nuclear power programmes. He noted that the recommendations of the Commission of Eminent Persons will be presented at this meeting and

requested the CSS views on these recommendations that would be very useful as the IAEA is in the process of developing policies and programmes to address the recommendations.

Mr Taniguchi also noted that the subject of new entrants to the Global Nuclear Safety Regime deserved specific mention. As highlighted not only in the report of the Commission of Eminent Persons, but also in the International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG) Chairman's letter to the IAEA DG, "new entrants may have experience in constructing and operating large-scale industrial and infrastructure projects, they may not be fully familiar with the unique requirements of nuclear power and thus may not fully recognize the major commitments and undertakings that they must assume…each new entrant has sweeping and difficult obligations to fulfil in assuring the capacity for continuing attention to safety over the entire life of the facility…" Mr Taniguchi felt that these points are particularly significant and must be borne in mind to ensure that the results of the work with safety standards in this area, including new safety guides, can be effectively applied not only in existing nuclear programmes, but also in emerging ones.

Mr Taniguchi then highlighted recent and upcoming events focusing on safety standards.

Three important upcoming and recent events were mentioned:

- First, the Senior Regulators' meeting on Friday, October 3rd 2008, during the 52nd General Conference;
- Second**,** the Scientific Forum, also during the General Conference, on September 30th 2008 and October 1st 2008; and
- Third, the recent meeting on responsibilities of vendor countries, recognizing the importance of involving vendors and component suppliers in the development of safety standards.

In each of these venues, IAEA Safety Standards would be or were central to the discussions among the many international participants. For the Senior Regulators' meeting, the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the IAEA Safety Standards would be an opportunity to discuss the future of the Safety Standards in the long-term. In the programme, a presentation from the CSS is planned to introduce a panel discussion. In this regard, the CSS should discuss its role towards the promotion of a high level of safety worldwide, including new nuclear power countries, based on the application and continuous improvement of the Safety Standards.

Mr Taniguchi then made brief remarks regarding some specific CSS activities, first the long-term structure and road map of safety standards.

He welcomed the adoption at the last CSS meeting of the CSS roadmap for the long-term structure of the IAEA Safety Standards. Such a plan allows for the finalization of a clear, consistent and integrated structure for Safety Requirements and the submission of a long-term list of Safety Guides with a manageable number of publications. It is important to emphasize that any reduction in number of Safety Guides should not result in a reduction of necessary recommendations. Notwithstanding, he felt that a manageable and user-friendly number of Safety Standards should result in better and fewer, at most 70 to 80, Safety Guides.

He highlighted the achievement of the two Safety Requirements submitted for the meeting of the Board of Governors later this month. The first is related to the revision of TS-R-1 on the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (the 2009 edition), and would achieve harmonization with other UN and modal transport regulations. With this revision, and in line with Board policy, it is anticipated that the frequency of future revisions will significantly decrease. The second is the new Safety

Requirements on Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste, which is the first thematic module of the long-term general safety requirements that implements the new format for safety requirements. He believed that these examples demonstrated the success and importance of the CSS in achieving continuous improvements to the IAEA Safety Standards.

Mr Taniguchi noted that one of the drafts submitted to the 24th meeting of the CSS is the Safety Requirements on Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities and, after its approval by the Committees, the Secretariat has made all efforts to prepare a version which complies with the CSS roadmap by adopting the new format for Safety Requirements. Therefore, he expected its endorsement with this new format so that this Safety Requirements would be already the second thematic module of the General Safety Requirements adopted, after the module on predisposal waste management endorsed at the last meeting. He noted that GS-R-1 on Legal and Governmental Infrastructure was now being revised also based on the same format.

Mr Taniguchi welcomed the establishment at the 23rd CSS meeting of a list of main topics for the 4th CSS term. In addition to the issue of the safety/security interface, the topics identified relate to safety infrastructure, new design, new application, ageing and long term operation, medical application, mining expansion, natural sources, human and organizational factors. He believed that all should be addressed, and noted that the Secretariat's draft plans for the 2010-2011 Programme and Budget already considered these issues.

Mr Taniguchi noted that there would also be a status report on the revision of the BSS including discussion on the plan to incorporate the new format. He believed that this is an important undertaking that will represent a key milestone in implementing the long-term structure of the Safety Standards.

Mr Taniguchi continued by noting that among the policy issues to be discussed, the safety/security interface remains an important one. The Safety Fundamentals states that "safety measures and security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner." This was further highlighted in the conclusion of the last CSS meeting and in the letter from Mr. Lacoste to the IAEA DG. Specifically, the important aspect mentioned in this letter that is related to the CSS mandate is the verification that "the recommendations from the security series publications do not compromise safety." [1] It would therefore be important for the CSS to discuss its advice on how to conduct this verification in the future and further steps toward more comprehensive integration in the long term.

Mr Taniguchi also addressed other policy considerations, noting that among the expectations for this meeting were a number of other important policy issues to be discussed, including the involvement of stakeholders and the feedback mechanisms for continuously improving the safety standards. Again, he believed that continuous improvements with vigilance are vital to sustain the good performance in safety and security, and advice from the CSS on how to further improve IAEA Safety Standards and their application as effective global standards would be very useful in this regard and therefore, CSS activities remain always a 'work in progress'.

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[1] "In addition to the current CSS overview role with regard to the Safety Standards Programme, the involvement of the CSS in the review of the nuclear security series publications must be considered so as to verify that the application of the safety related recommendations give to Member States does not compromise security and that the recommendations from the security series publication do not compromise safety." Letter from A.-C. Lacoste to IAEA Director General Dr. ElBaradei, dated July 2, 2008.

Mr Taniguchi closed his remarks by taking the opportunity to welcome Mr. Khammar Mrabit as the new Head of Safety and Security Coordination Section, succeeding Mr. Luis Lederman. He noted that Mr Mrabit brings to this assignment a wealth of technical and policy expertise from his more than twenty years with the IAEA and a high level of enthusiasm for ensuring the continued success of this programme. He wished the members of the CSS very productive dialogue again in this session.

1.2 Introductions, Adoption of the Agenda, Adoption of the 23rd CSS meeting report

Mr Lacoste, Chairman of the Commission, welcomed participants and informed the meeting of the recent nomination of two new members of the Commission: Mr. Chul Ho Yun from Korea and Mr. Peter Faross from the EC to replace Mr. Waeterloos.

He indicated that apologies had been received from Mr. Jammal from Canada (Mr Rzentkowski represented Canada at the meeting), Mr Fukushima from Japan (Mr Ohmura represented Japan at the meeting), Mr Sharma from India, Mr Yun from Korea, Mr Raman from Pakistan, Mr. Magugumela from South Africa (who will be replaced by Mr. Clapisson, to be nominated by the DG), Mr. Weightman from the UK (Mr. Creswell represented the UK at the meeting), Mr. Dung from Vietnam, Mr. Faross from the EC (Ms Blohm Hieber represented the EC at the meeting), Mr. Holm from the ICRP (Ms. Sugier represented the ICRP at the meeting), Mr. Meserve from INSAG, Mr. Tanaka from the NEA (who will be replaced by Mr. Yoshimura, to be nominated by the DG). Mr Lacoste also welcomed Mr Khammar Mrabit. A list of participants is provided in Annex I.

The USA had submitted requests to include on the agenda a discussion on the integration of safety and security and a discussion of how the main topics for the fourth term of the CSS would be addressed. Mr Lacoste proposed that these issues be addressed under item 3.1. The proposed agenda was approved. The approved agenda is provided in Annex II.

Mr Delattre informed the Commission that the draft report of the 23rd CSS meeting had been made available on July 2nd 2008 and that the comments posted by the USA had been incorporated. The report of the 23rd CSS meeting was approved. [Annex III, Action 24.1]

1.3 Administrative arrangements for the meeting and Status of the endorsed Standards and Response to Actions from the 23rd Meeting

Mr Delattre briefly informed the Commission of administrative arrangements for the meeting. He noted that all material had been made available two months in advance of the meeting for effective review by the Commission.

Mr Delattre presented the status of the endorsed Safety Standards. He noted that eight Safety Standards had been published so far in 2008:

- Operational Limits and Conditions and Operating Procedures for Research Reactors, NS-G-4.4 (DS261)
- The Management System for Technical Services in Radiation Safety, GS-G-3.2 (DS315)
- The Operating Organization and the Recruitment, Training and Qualification of Personnel for Research Reactors, NS-G-4.5 (DS325)
- The Management System for Processing, Handling and Storage of Radioactive Waste, GS-G-3.3 (DS336)
- The Management System for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste, GS-G-3.4 (DS337)
- Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, TS-G-1.1 (DS346)

- Conduct of Operations at Nuclear Power Plants, NS-G-2.14 (DS347)
- Core Management and Fuel Handling for Research Reactors, NS-G-4.3 (DS350)

He provided details on ten further Safety Standards, endorsed by the Commission, that were being published:

- Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities (DS316)
- Safety of Uranium Fuel Fabrication Facilities (DS317)
- Safety of MOX Fuel Fabrication Facilities (DS318)
- Management System for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (DS326)
- Compliance Assurance for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (DS327)
- Radiation Protection and Radioactive Waste Management in the Design and Operation of Research Reactors (DS340)
- Safety of Conversion and Enrichment facilities (DS344)
- Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (DS345)
- Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste (DS353)
- Safety Assessment for Decommissioning of Facilities using Radioactive Material (DS376)

Mr Delattre also informed the Commission of the status of actions arising from the 23rd CSS meeting (see Annex IV) and of the agenda for the forthcoming Senior Regulators' meeting.

Mr Gonzalez queried the reason for submitting the table of changes to the Regulations for the Safety Transport of Radioactive Material (TS-R-1, 2009 edition) to the Board of Governors, rather than the full text. Mr Brach noted that it had been at the request of the Board of Governors, and Ms Amaral recalled that, for earlier editions of TS-R-1, only the table of changes had been submitted.

Mr Virgilio praised the dissemination to the CSS of the list of actions two weeks after the 23rd CSS meeting. Mr Delattre confirmed that the same approach would be followed for the 24th meeting. [Annex III, Action 24.2]. Mr. Virgilio further recommended that, at the end of each CSS meeting, the conclusions and action items should be projected in the screen/overhead for all CSS members to review and reach alignment, thus, reducing the time it currently takes to review and agree on such conclusions and action items. Mr Virgilio also requested the Secretariat to consider streaming via internet or video-conference the Senior Regulators' Meeting, providing the issue of confidentiality could be solved appropriately.

2. Information from the NS Department on recent activities related to safety standards and other safety and security related publications

2.1 Information on the recommendations from the Commission of Eminent Persons on the 20/20 Report

Mr Mrabit provided a summary of the recommendations from the Commission of Eminent Persons (CEP) on the 20/20 Report.

In the discussion that followed, members of the CSS felt that, although some CEP recommendations relating to safety were appropriate, some were perhaps less so, and the CSS should be consulted on possible ways to implement the safety related recommendations. Mr Taniguchi noted that the response to the CEP report had been enthusiastic at the very highest level, but that the IAEA's Board of Governors, for example, had considered it less favorably. The CEP report would be considered at the Scientific Forum during the forthcoming 52nd IAEA General Conference, and the proposal for the new Programme and Budget would reflect the recommendations contained in it.

Mr. Virgilio noted some inconsistencies within the report. Specifically, he discussed the report's implementation strategies for countries that want to embark on nuclear power, that is, the implementation of models that would make the benefits of nuclear energy available to states that lack the expert personnel and infrastructure needed to build or operate reactors on their own. Mr. Virgilio recognized the importance of this recommendation from a non-proliferation perspective. However, he emphasized the report's recommendation that member states have strong, effective and independent regulatory bodies, which a turnkey operation would not fully support.

Mr Lacoste proposed that he would prepare, in consultation with CSS members, a note on preliminary remarks on the report from the CEP to be sent to the IAEA Director General [Annex III, Action 24.3]. His response would address such aspects as the difficulties associated with harmonizing reactor certification, the challenges of moving from 'voluntary' to 'mandatory' standards and the importance of involving the Commission on Safety Standards in addressing the CEP recommendations.

2.2 Information on AdSec activities

Mr Hashmi gave a presentation on the activities of AdSec, including some background information on AdSec and the nuclear security programme of the IAEA, and an overview of the structure and status of publications in the Nuclear Security Series. He also presented report on feedback from the review of security related aspects during the IRRS mission to Spain. Feedback from the mission indicated several recommendations, and it was concluded that the mission was considered to have been reasonably effective, but that such missions including security could be made more effective.

Mr Lacoste welcomed the report on the IRRS mission to Spain, which was the first of its kind. Mr Virgilio indicated further recommendations, including the need for guidance on the integration of safety and security before the next IRRS mission including security, the need to develop processes to handle sensitive information and findings from the security review module, the need for more consultation between experts in the team and the need for a larger team of security experts to coordinate the review of the many agencies that have responsibilities in the area. Mr Gonzalez also referred to the International Conference of National Regulatory Authorities with Competence in the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Material, held in 2000 in Buenos Aires. He noted that the responsibilities of the Commission on Safety Standards in relation to security remained unclear and Mr Hashmi again emphasized the need to integrate safety and security. In response to Ms Sugier's query, Mr Jamet responded that, although each country should decide itself what type of IRRS mission it required, the IAEA would favour as much integration as possible.

However, Mr Barceló Vernet noted that Spain had reached different conclusions on the IRRS mission, and feared that, because of the issue of confidentiality, full integration of safety and security in an IRRS mission would remain difficult.

2.3 Information on the status of the revision of the BSS

Ms Amaral presented a status report on the revision of the BSS. She outlined the planned schedule for the review and revision of the BSS and informed the Commission that the Secretariat is presently continuing to work on a document indicating the tracking and justification of changes. She further noted the issues requiring further work, including explanation of the system of protection and safety, radon, exemption and clearance levels and updating definitions for the glossary. She gave examples of issues that expected to raise some discussion with cosponsors, including non-medical imaging, generic criteria for protective actions in emergencies, the supplementary symbol published by ISO and protection of the environment. Future milestones include technical meetings and workshops addressing such issues as how to proceed with implementing the new format for Safety Requirements, and it is expected that, following approval by RASSC in June 2009, the BSS will be submitted to Member States for 120-day comment.

Mr Amaral also informed the Commission of a presentation on recent activities of NSRW, which had been placed on the CSS website for information.

In the discussion that followed, Ms Amaral clarified that the BSS would not address requirements on protection of biota, since there is not yet a scientific agreement on the matter. Therefore it would set concepts that allow numerical values to be derived, rather than setting numerical values themselves. Ms Amaral also clarified the place of the BSS in the long-term structure for the Safety Standards, noting that it would be cross-cutting and self-standing, but that safety requirements established in other publications would not be repeated unless to assure the completeness of the BSS.

Mr Gonzalez praised the BSS for its inclusion of numerical values and for the cooperation with other organizations. He emphasized the need for a useable format. He addressed protection of the environment, where it continues to be assumed that protection of humans implies protection of the environment; and removal of the concept of dose per unit intake, where, for radon, for example, knowledge of the conversion factor is crucial. He noted that guidance on occupational protection is provided in three separate Safety Guides and requested the Secretariat to consider combining these Guides.

Mr Tanaka noted that good coordination would be needed to deal with the many comments expected. On the issue of the timescale for implementation of the new format, Mr Magnusson noted that much depends on the outcome of RASSC discussions in November, and that it was more important to agree firstly on the content. He indicated that the implementation of the new format will need to be discussed with the co-sponsors and would most probably occur during the last stage of the revision process when the BSS is approved for Member State review. Mr Lacoste concluded the discussions by noting that if the ideas in a Safety Standard are clear, implementation of the new format will not be difficult and can be done for the second RASSC review before submission to Member States..

3. Policy discussion

3.1 Introduction of policy discussion: Letter from the CSS Chair to the IAEA Director General

Mr Lacoste introduced the discussion by making reference to his letter to the IAEA Director General informing him on the policy for the long-term structure of the Safety Standards and the main topics to be addressed by the CSS in its fourth term (Action 23.11 of the 23rd CSS meeting, see Annex IV, 23.11).

Mr. Virgilio discussed the significance of the list of main topics to be addressed during the fourth term. Mr. Virgilio encouraged the CSS to engage in a dialogue on how the CSS will address and schedule the main topics over the next four years. He emphasized the need to define a plan that delineates how the CSS will achieve and measure the progress and success of each of these main topics. He noted that the list is not inclusive and that emerging issues will need to be address and prioritize accordingly. For example,, DPPs for Safety Standards should be checked against the list of main topics. Mr Delattre agreed to check with the Chairs of the Committees that the list of safety guides proposed for the long term appropriately covers the main topics identified as priorities by the CSS [Annex III, Action 24.4]. Mr Lacoste further suggested that the Commission should produce a mid-term, interim report after 2 years, on progress on the main topics [Annex III, Action 24.5]

With regard to the issue of integration of safety and security, Ms Nilsson noted that it should be seen in the perspective of the proposed establishment of *Safety and Security Standards*, which was a welcome and significant development. In that regard, , Member States underline the voluntary nature of security guidance contrary to the more binding perception of safety standards. When moving into an integrated scheme, with safety and security standards, the mandatory nature of INFCIRC/225, entitled The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material must be observed as it is commonly referenced in bilateral cooperation and supply agreements. She noted that it was important to develop a practical plan for the establishment of Safety and Security Standards, which is also politically acceptable. Ms. Nilsson also provided information on the status of the various documents that would be included in the Nuclear Security Series Framework. Mr Gonzalez pointed out that the IAEA had indeed a mandate for developing security standards, providing it was clear that security is for safety objectives, rather than for security objectives.

Mr Lacoste requested the Secretariat to prepare a report on the integration of safety and security, in consultation with members of the Commission, and to present it at the 25th CSS meeting [Annex III, Action 24.6]. Mr Loy further requested the Secretariat to provide to the Commission, when available, the result of the review of the legal framework for IAEA activities on security [Annex III, Action 24.7].

3.2 Role and activities of the Commission. Discussion on the Terms of Reference of the CSS

In response to Action 23.1 of the 23rd meeting of the Commission (see Annex IV, 23.1), the USA had provided comments on the Terms of Reference for the Commission on Safety Standards. The USA's comments addressed the need to clarify the Commission's responsibility to establish an effective and efficient standards development process with emphasis on prioritization, as well as to implement information technology tools and capabilities that will provide timely and effective coordination and communication. Further, the USA recommended that the CSS Terms of Reference be revised to require the CSS to submit a four-year report summarizing the accomplishments of the four-year term with recommended priorities for the next term.

The USA comments also addressed the need to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the CSS with respect to security. The members of the Commission agreed that the integration of safety and security should be considered and addressed in the future Terms of Reference. . Mr. Virgilio acknowledged the implications that such a revision would entail because it would change the scope of the CSS roles and responsibilities and thus possibly change its membership/composition. The knowledge and skill sets of the CSS members would need to be broadened to include security. The Commission also agreed that any change to the Terms of Reference proposed to the IAEA Director General would take effect from the next four-year term of the Commission, rather than applying for the current term.

The Secretariat was requested to prepare a proposal for revision of the Terms of Reference for presentation at the 25th CSS meeting [Annex III, Action 24.8].

3.3 Discussion on the status and objective of the IAEA Safety Standards

Mr Delattre presented the proposed revision of the generic text for the IAEA Safety Standards. The USA and Australia had provided comments on the proposed text. The Commission discussed the comments provided, recognizing that most of the proposed text is taken from SF-1 and the CSS roadmap and has already been approved recently.

The Commission agreed that the revised generic text, with implementation of the agreed modifications, will be submitted to the CSS members for confirmation of approval [Annex III, Action 24.9]. *Note: This was confirmed after the meeting (see final text in Annex V).*

3.4 Discussion on stakeholder involvement in the preparation of Safety Standards

Mr Lacoste drew attention to the distinction between stakeholder involvement in the development of Safety Standards and stakeholder involvement in their review and approval. He noted that the list of stakeholders includes not only industry but also all non-governmental organizations. The Commission discussed the various types of organizations that could be considered stakeholders, and members reported briefly on the experiences gained in their countries in involving stakeholders in the drafting and review of regulations.

Mr Lacoste suggested that a particular draft Standard could be used as a preliminary ‘experiment’ for the involvement of stakeholders. Mr Taniguchi urged caution in instigating such a step, and Mr Vaughan and Mr Vernet recalled from their experience that, depending on how they are solicited, the number of comments received could be too many or, indeed, too few to be useful. Mr Brach noted that the 2004 Action Plan for the Safety Standards had called on Member States to solicit input from stakeholders, and gave the example of the Transport Regulations, for which representatives of industry are present at technical meetings. Mr Lacoste therefore requested the members of the Commission to provide information, and report at the 25th CSS meeting, on national practices in stakeholder involvement [Annex III, Action 24.10].]. In addition, the Chairs of the SSCs will collaborate and prepare a draft paper on the role of stakeholders in the IAEA standards development process. This paper should be available for discussion at the April 2009 CSS meeting.

3.5 Finalization of the long-term structure and format of Safety Requirements (Application of the CSS roadmap)

Mr Delattre presented the long-term structure and format of Safety Requirements. Japan had provided comments relating to ensuring that Principle 8 of SF-1 on prevention of accidents would be developed fully in the General Safety Requirements and the need to retain flexibility in the face of the potential difficulty of applying the new format for Specific Safety Requirements. The USA had provided

comments relating to the need to indicate the three levels of safety standards and coverage of discharges to the environment in the new structure.

Mr Delattre clarified that, as reported at a previous CSS meeting, there is no gap for the requirements on prevention of accident as they will be addressed through general requirements in the future volume 3 of the GSR and with specific requirements in each of the facility specific areas. He also clarified that discharges will be addressed within the revision of the BSS and therefore in the future volume 3 of the GSR. Mr Delattre highlighted that the recently endorsed DS353 and DS348 for endorsement at this 24th CSS meeting already implement the new format of safety requirements. Mr Vaughan noted that the applicability of the graded approach for all facilities and activities should be emphasized.

Mr Gonzalez believed that the issue merited deeper analysis and suggested the review by a high level group. Mr Lacoste reminded of the several years of work that had gone into developing the policy at a high level with the CSS task force including the Chairs of the Committees.

The Commission approved the policy on the long-term structure and format of Safety Requirements, with implementation of the agreed modifications (see Annex VI).

3.6 Establishment of criteria for Safety Guides, status report on the long-term list of Safety Guides and revised DPP template (Application of the CSS roadmap)

Mr Delattre presented criteria for the long-term set of Safety Guides, and a revised template for DPPs.

The USA had recommended, and the Commission agreed: that prioritization of activities needs to consider the main topics to be addressed during this fourth term of the CSS; that no limit should be placed on the total number of Safety Guides, rather an overall number of all Safety Standards could be kept in mind as an indicator; that there should be no limit on the number of words allowed in the various sections of the DPP template; and that a gap analysis should be carried out and feedback from Member States should be included to justify the proposed publication. Mr. Virgilio emphasized the importance of a gap analysis as well as the need to have a robust and sound justification for developing a, or revising an existing, safety guide. Japan also provided comments relating to the importance of estimating resources, and Mr Delattre confirmed that a section on estimated resources would be added to the end of the DPP template.

Mr Taniguchi drew attention to the differences between the various categories of safety related publications of the IAEA: TECDOCs are intended to be supporting documents of a transitory nature, while information that may be expected to be longstanding is published as a Safety Report. He also noted the pressures to develop ever more Safety Guides, and emphasized the need for an integrated approach.

Mr Loy proposed, and the Commission agreed, that the importance of integrating safety measures and security measures should also be reflected in the criteria for Safety Guides.

The Commission approved the criteria for the long-term set of Safety Guides and the revised DPP template, with implementation of the agreed modifications (Annexes VII and VIII, respectively).

3.7 Feedback mechanisms to improve the Safety Standards

Ms K. Asfaw presented an overview of the various mechanisms used to obtain feedback on the application of the Safety Standards and summarized plans to strengthen the current feedback mechanisms and exploit other existing data sources.

In the discussion that followed, Mr. Virgilio emphasized importance of the INSAG-22, “Improving the International System for Operating Experience Feedback (OEF),” to the feedback mechanisms. Mr.

Virgilio noted the INSAG-22 report's recommendation that the OEF system be strengthened to provide an effective vehicle for sharing experiences and lessons- learned. Mr Virgilio also noted that the revision of the Safety Guide on Periodic Safety Review for Nuclear Power Plants (DS426) is to include a recommendation for dissemination of operational experience feedback, and suggested that the consultancy meeting on Generic Safety Issues (held concurrently with the CSS meeting) could be a further source of feedback. Mr Gonzalez recommended establishing links to regional networks, such as that of the Ibero-American Forum, to obtain feedback on the application of Standards. Mr Adamchik provided the Commission with information on how feedback is obtained in the Russian Federation on national implementation of regulations and offered to submit the results of this study.

Mr Brach informed the Commission that TRANSSC had implemented a process to obtain feedback from its members on the application of TS-R-1, and Mr Lacoste requested the Chairs of the other Committees to consider implementing a similar process to collect feedback from their members [Annex III, Action 24.11].

Mr G. Caruso then gave a presentation on feedback from the IRRS missions. Members of the Commission discussed the challenges of integrating safety and security in an IRRS mission, and Mr Lacoste noted that the approach to integration is technical, rather than organizational.

In response to Ms Sugier's query, Mr Caruso replied that information on any weaknesses identified in the content or scope of a Safety Standard is fed back into the revision of the Standard. Mr Larsson noted the large amount of work necessary for preparation for an IRRS mission and requested the Secretariat to consider streamlining the process.

3.8 Harmonization of terminology and progress report on the long-term IAEA Safety Glossary

Mr D. Delves presented a progress report on the IAEA Safety Glossary, addressing the nature and evolution of the Glossary and the relationship between the Glossary and the Standards, noting recent and future developments. At the meeting of the five chairs (CSS and Committees), it was recommended that Mr Lacoste proposes to the Commission that the Glossary be revised with the aim of producing a high-level publication containing a set of prescriptive definitions that would apply for all Safety Standards publications with a view to harmonizing the use of terminology. Mr Delattre noted the need for a rigorous process for revision of the Glossary, and suggested it should be submitted to the Committees for review, in parallel with the review of the BSS.

Ms Mykolaichuk indicated a term for which the Russian translation was not seen as appropriate, and recommended that a team of experts check terms in all languages.

Mr Gonzalez emphasized the need for a Glossary 'a priori', which would be formal and prescriptive. Mr Virgilio noted that there needed to be a strong link to the Standards, with cross-references between the Standards and the Glossary, and tracking of the development of changes. Mr Magnusson requested the Secretariat to consider seeking cosponsors for the Glossary.

Mr Lacoste requested the Secretariat to develop in cooperation with the Chairs of the Committees a procedure for revision of the Glossary for approval by the Commission and to submit the Glossary to the Committees for review [Annex III, Action 24.12].

3.9 Procedures for the implementation of the policies and the safety standards management system (MANSYS)

Mr Delattre presented information on the development of MANSYS. He noted that draft 0.2 of MANSYS had been prepared and that comments and policy decisions discussed at the 24th CSS meeting would be included in a draft 0.3 of MANSYS to be made available for review by the Committees in early 2009.

Mr Vaughan requested the Secretariat to make the draft of MANSYS available for members of the Committees on the web site, and to provide a short guide to assist those drafting Safety Standards [Annex III, Action 24.13].

Mr Ohmura suggested few improvements including a request to provide the Committees with the resolution of comments and to make available versions of Safety Standards with changes marked. Mr Virgilio suggested some available methodologies (e.g., Business Process Review techniques such as Lean Six Sigma) and software (e.g., SharePoint software) that could be exploited to optimize the process flow.

Mr Lacoste requested the Secretariat to use the experience of Member States in streamlining its procedures and to continue, as planned, to develop draft 0.3 of MANSYS [Annex III, Action 24.13].

4. Feedback from the Commission on the Application of Safety Standards and Regulatory Issues

4.1 Topical discussion on the Use of Safety Standards

Almost all presentations had been sent in advance to the meeting and were posted on the CSS web page. The material will remain available for all members in an archive file on the web page (http://www-ns.iaea.org/committees/css/) in the folder “Presentations provided by the CSS members”

4.2 Regulatory Issues in the Member States

As for item 4.1, almost all presentations on related regulatory issues had been provided in advance. The material will also remain available for all members in an archive file on the web page (http://www-ns.iaea.org/committees/css/) in the folder “Presentations provided by the CSS members”

Mr Samain provided the Commission with a brief report of the incident that took place on August 26th 2008 at the Institut des Radioéléments (IRE) at Fleurus, Belgium. He indicated that a report containing information available at the time of the meeting was available at the website http://fanc.fgov.be.

5. Draft publications and DPPs

5.1 Borehole Facilities for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste (DS335)

Mr L. Jova Sed presented the draft Safety Guide for approval for publication. Mr Patter, Chairman of the WASSC, addressed comments that had been received from Japan and the USA. In response to Mr Levanon’s query on the relationship with the future safety requirements DS354, Mr Delattre confirmed that the Safety Guide would later be revised when new Safety Requirements publications, currently under development, are published.

The Commission endorsed the draft for publication.

5.2 Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities, Safety Requirements (DS348)

Mr M. El Shanawany presented the draft Safety Requirements publication for approval for submission to the Board of Governors and indicated the Secretariat's proposal to address comments that had been received from Australia, Japan, Ukraine and the USA. Mr Ohmura noted the importance for the members that the Secretariat provides information on the tracking of changes through earlier versions of the text. Mr Lacoste drew attention to the format of DS348 and noted how easy adoption of the new format had been once the concepts were clearly set out. The Chairs of the SSCs also indicated their satisfaction with the new format of the Safety Requirements. . Additional insights will be gained as other safety requirements are converted to the new format.

The Commission approved the draft for submission to the Board of Governors.

5.3 Management System for Nuclear Installations, to supersede SS5-SG-Q8 to Q14 (DS349)

Mr P. Vincze presented the draft Safety Guide for approval for publication. No comments had been received prior to the meeting. Mr Gonzalez and Mr Vinhas stated their conviction that the subject of the management system ought not to be part of the IAEA Safety Standards programme; however both members indicated that they follow the view of the Commission if there is a vast majority.

The Commission endorsed the draft for publication.

5.4 Ageing Management for Nuclear Power Plants (DS382)

Mr M. Kearney presented the draft Safety Guide for approval for publication and indicated the Secretariat's proposal to address late comments that had been received from Ukraine.

The Commission endorsed the draft for publication.

5.5 Seismic Evaluation for Nuclear Power Plants (DS383)

Mr A. Godoy presented the draft Safety Guide for approval for publication and indicated the Secretariat's proposal to address late comments that had been received from Ukraine. In response to Mr Liu Hua's query as to whether the methodology for seismic evaluation of existing installations could be usefully included as an annex to the Guide, Mr Godoy explained that quantitative values could be found in the publication Seismic Evaluation of Existing Nuclear Power Plants, Safety Reports Series No. 28. Mr Gonzalez felt that it could be difficult to apply the recommended value of peak ground acceleration of 0.1g in carrying out seismic evaluation for older plants. Mr Godoy considered that the value could be checked using the SMA and SPSA methodologies explained in the Guide.

Mr Vaughan expressed his dissatisfaction with the procedure through which the late comments from Ukraine had been addressed, and Mr Lacoste reminded the Secretariat that all changes to draft Standards submitted to the CSS for endorsement must first be approved by the Chair of the lead Safety Standards Committee and reminded the CSS members to provide their comments within the established deadline. Following a short delay for consultation with Mr Godoy and Ms Mykolaichuk, Mr Vaughan approved the draft.

The Commission endorsed the draft for publication.

5.6 Classification of Radioactive Waste, to supersede SS 111-G-1.1 (DS390)

Mr D. Louvat presented the draft Safety Guide for approval for publication and indicated the Secretariat's proposal to address comments that had been received from Australia and the USA. The Commission agreed that the Guide should address the classification of waste containing NORM in a general sense, rather than include the specific example of mill tailings. Mr Loy referred to his earlier expectation that the Safety Guide would provide quantitative values, but noted that the Guide instead presented more of a framework for the classification of waste. The Commission decided to retain the title, retain Annex II and retain para. III.19, but to change para 1.1 as suggested, to move a figure from Annex III into the main text and to delete an unpublished reference.

The Commission endorsed the draft Safety Guide for publication with the agreed changes.

5.7 Severe Accident Management Programme for Nuclear Power Plants (DS385)

Mr S. Lee presented the draft Safety Guide for approval for publication and indicated the Secretariat's proposal to address comments that had been received from Japan and the USA. Mr Virgilio emphasized that, as stated in para. 3.85, any violation of licence specifications or technical specifications that may be necessary to mitigate a severe accident must still be subject to control. Mr Gonzalez questioned the usefulness of Figure 1.

The Commission endorsed the draft for publication.

5.8 Information on the revision of the DPPs DS419 and DS420 for the integration of security provisions

Mr T. Boal presented the two DPPs and informed the Commission of comments made by the USA to include references to publications in the Nuclear Security Series and to add an element on Safety-Security Interfaces to Section 3 of the Outline of Contents of the two Safety Guides. Mr Lacoste and the members of the Commission urged the Secretariat to proceed with development of the Guides quickly using a practical and consultative approach. Mr Virgilio suggested that the Guides could be later cross-checked against the report on the integration of safety and security [Annex III, Action 24.6].

6. Report of the Meeting, Date of the next Meetings

Mr Lacoste summarized the main findings of the meeting and informed the Commission that a detailed list of main conclusions and actions resulting from the meeting would be issued within two weeks [Annex III, Action 24.2].

Mr Lacoste also took the opportunity to make an official statement recognizing the importance of the input from the Chairs of the Safety Standards Committees at the CSS meetings and confirming that they are considered full participants of the Commission on Safety Standards.

Mr Gonzalez requested Mr Lacoste to provide the Commission with information on the outcome of his meeting with the IAEA Director General, planned for September 5th 2008 [Annex III, Action 24.14].

Mr Delattre informed the Commission that a draft report of the meeting would be prepared by the Scientific Secretary of the Commission and sent for comment to the members with a view to its approval at the next meeting [Annex III, Action 24.15].

The next meetings are planned to be held from: **22 to 24 April 2009** and from **14 to 16 October 2009**.

ANNEX I

PARTICIPATION AT THE 24TH CSS MEETING

The Commission

A.J. González, Argentina

J. Loy, Australia

J.-P. Samain, Belgium

L.A. Vinhas, Brazil

R. Jammal, Canada (sent apologies – unable to attend)

Liu Hua, China

M. B. F. Barakat, Egypt

Y. Laaksonen, Finland

A-C. Lacoste, (Chairman) France

D. Majer, Germany

S. K. Sharma, India (sent apologies – unable to attend)

I. Levanon, Israel

A. Fukushima, Japan

C. H. Yun, Korea (sent apologies – unable to attend)

G. Maksimovas, Lithuania

M. S. Rahman, Pakistan (sent apologies – unable to attend)

S. Adamchik, Russian Federation

M.T. Magugumela, South Africa (sent apologies – unable to attend)

J. Barceló Vernet, Spain

C.-M. Larsson, Sweden

O. Mykolaichuk, Ukraine

M. Weightman, United Kingdom (sent apologies – unable to attend)

M. Virgilio, United States of America

L. C. Dung, Vietnam (sent apologies – unable to attend)

Observers

J. A. Hashmi, AdSec

P. Faross, EC (sent apologies – unable to attend)

L-E. Holm, ICRP (sent apologies – unable to attend)

R. Meserve, INSAG (sent apologies – unable to attend)

U. Yoshimura, OECD NEA

Chairmen of Committees

G. Vaughan, NUSSC

S. Magnusson, RASSC

E. W. Brach, TRANSSC

T. Pather, WASSC

Representatives and associated experts

Mr Rzentkowski, Mr Peng Jun, Ms Forest, Mr Lachaume, Mr Nomoto, Mr Ogiso, Mr Ohmura, Mr Ugayama, Ms Spevakova, Mr Clapisson, Ms Collet-Campo, Mr Creswell, Ms Astwood, Mr Borchardt, Ms Diaz Toro, Ms Blohm-Hieber, Mr Vigne, Ms Sugier and Mr Yoshimura

IAEA Staff Members

T. Taniguchi, Deputy Director General, Department of Nuclear Safety and Security

E. Amaral, Director, Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety (NSRW)

A. Nilsson, Director, Office of Nuclear Security (NSNS)

P. Jamet, Director, Division of Nuclear Installation Safety (NSNI)

K. Mrabit, Head, Safety and Security Coordination Section (SSCS)

W. Stern, Head, Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) (sent apologies – unable to attend)

H. Abou Yehia, G. Caruso, R. Czarwinski, P. Colgan, M. El Shanawany, A. Godoy, M. Gregoric, R. Hoskins, M. Lipar, D. Louvat, K. Mrabit, C. Viktorsson

K. Asfaw, T. Boal, E. Buglova, D. Delves, M. El Shanawany, A. Godoy, M. Kearney, S. Lee, D. Louvat, L. Jova Sed, P. Vincze

Safety Standards coordinators

G. Feige, Policy and Programme Support Section (NSNI), NUSSC (sent apologies – unable to attend)

G. Siraky, Waste and Environmental Safety Section (NSRW), WASSC

J. Stewart, Regulatory Infrastructure and Transport Safety Section (NSRW), TRANSSC

T. Boal, Radiation Safety and Monitoring Services Section (NSRW), RASSC

D. Delattre, Scientific Secretary of the CSS, Safety and Security Coordination Section

ANNEX II

AGENDA

Twenty fourth Meeting of the

COMMISSION ON SAFETY STANDARDS

3 – 5 September 2008

VIC – Boardroom C04

1. Opening Session

1.1 Opening of the Meeting (10:00); *T. Taniguchi; DDG*-NS

1.2 Introductions, Adoption of the Agenda, Adoption of the 23rd CSS meeting report; *A.-C. Lacoste*

1.3 Administrative arrangements for the meeting and Status of the endorsed Standards and Response to Actions from the 23rd Meeting; *D. Delattre*

2. Information from the NS Department on recent activities related to safety standards and other safety and security related publications

2.1 Information on the recommendations from the Commission of Eminent Persons on the 20/20 Report; *K. Mrabit*

2.2 Information on ADSec activities; *J.Hasmi*

2.3 Information on the status of the revision of the BSS*; E. Amaral*

3. Policy discussion

3.1 Introduction of policy discussion: Letter from the CSS Chair to the IAEA Director General; *A.-C. Lacoste*

3.2 Role and activities of the Commission. Discussion on the Terms of Reference of the CSS; *CSS members*

3.3 Discussion on the status and objective of the IAEA Safety Standards; *CSS members*

3.4 Discussion on stakeholder involvement in the preparation of Safety Standards; *CSS members*

3.5 Finalization of the long-term structure and format of Safety Requirements (Application of the CSS roadmap); *D. Delattre, CSS members*

3.6 Establishment of criteria for Safety Guides, status report on the long-term list of Safety Guides and revised DPP template (Application of the CSS roadmap); *D. Delattre, CSS members*

3.7 Feedback mechanisms to improve the Safety Standards; *K. Asfaw* and feedback from IRRS missions; *NSNI and NSRW, CSS members*

3.8 Harmonization of terminology and progress report on the IAEA Safety Glossary*; D. Delves and CSS members*.

3.9 Procedures for the implementation of the policies and progress report and timeline for the further development of the safety standards management system (MANSYS)*; D. Delattre and CSS members*.

4. Feedback from the Commission on the application of safety standards and regulatory issues

4.1 Topical discussion on the Use of Safety Standards; *(CSS Members)*

4.2 Regulatory Issues in the Member States; *(CSS Members)*

5. Approval of draft publications and DPPs

5.1 Borehole Facilities for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste (DS335)*; L. Jova Sed*

5.2 Safety Assessment and Verification, Safety Requirements (DS348); *M. El Shanawany*

5.3 Management System for Nuclear Installations, to supersede SS50-SG-Q8 to 14 (DS349)*; P. Vincze*

5.4 Ageing Management for Nuclear Power Plants (DS382)*; M. Kearney*

5.5 Seismic Evaluation of Existing Nuclear Facilities (DS383)*; A. Godoy*

5.6 Classification of Radioactive Waste, to supersede of SS 111-G-1.1 (DS390); *D. Louvat*

5.7 Severe Accident Management Programme for Nuclear Power Plants (DS385); *S. Lee*

5.8 Information on the revision of the DPP DS419 and DS420 for the integration of security provisions; *T. Boal*

6. Report of the Meeting, Date of the next meetings

- 22-24 April 2009

- 14-16 October 2009

ANNEX III

ACTIONS ARISING FROM THE 24th MEETING OF THE COMMISSION

Rev. 1 (06/10/2008) approved by the CSS

24.1. Post on the safety standards web site the final report of the 23rd CSS meeting with the agreed resolution of comments **[Action: Secretariat]**

24.2. Provide for comments to the CSS members a summary of the main conclusions of the 24th CSS meeting together with a list of actions resulting from the meeting **[Action: Secretariat]**

24.3. Prepare, in consultation with CSS members, a note on preliminary remarks on the report from the Commission of Eminent Persons to be sent to the IAEA Director General **[Action: CSS Chair with CSS members]**

24.4. Check at the meeting with the Chairs of the Safety Standards Committees that the main topics identified as priorities at the 23rd CSS meeting are addressed in the proposal from the Secretariat on the long-term list of safety guides **[Action: Secretariat with the Chairs of the Safety Standards Committees]**

24.5. Prepare at mid-term (two years) a report on progress on the main topics identified as priorities at the 23rd CSS meeting **[Action: Secretariat]**

24.6. Prepare for the 25th CSS meeting a report on approach for enhancing synergies between safety and security **[Action: Secretariat]**

24.7. Provide to the CSS, when available, the result of the review of the legal framework for the IAEA activities on security **[Action: Secretariat]**

24.8. Prepare for the next meeting a proposal for a revision of the Terms of Reference of the CSS **[Action: Secretariat]**

24.9. Submit for confirmation of approval to the CSS members a revised generic text taking into account the agreed resolution of comments **[Action: Secretariat]**

24.10. Request the CSS members to report at the 25th meeting on national practices on stakeholder involvement **[Action: Secretariat and CSS members]**

24.11. Organize discussion within each Safety Standards Committee on approaches to ensure a more systematic feedback mechanism on the safety standards, involving also the potential co-sponsors and other stakeholders **[Action: Safety Standards Committees Chairs]**

24.12. Prepare, in consultation with the Chairs of the Safety Standards Committees, a procedure for the review/revision of the IAEA Safety Glossary and submit the glossary for review to the Safety Standards Committees **[Action: Secretariat with the Chairs of the Safety Standards Committees]**

24.13. Update the document on Management System for the safety standards in order to reflect the conclusions of the 23rd and 24th CSS meetings and submit the draft to the Safety Standards Committees **[Action: Secretariat]**

24.14. Inform the CSS members of the conclusions of the meeting of the Chair of the CSS with the IAEA Director General **[Action: CSS Chair]**

24.15. The draft report of the 24th CSS meeting to be posted for comments to the CSS web site **[Action: Secretariat]**

ANNEX IV

STATUS ON ACTIONS ARISING FROM THE 23rd MEETING OF THE COMMISSION

23.1. Submit to the Secretariat, in time for the next meeting of the CSS, suggestions for amending the Terms of Reference of the CSS (*ref. Item 1.5*) **[Action: CSS members]** Suggestions made by the USA. This was discussed under agenda item 3.2.

23.2. Codify in the process for establishing Safety Standards the involvement of stakeholders (Member States, regulators, industry, and others) and describe this in the Management System Document for the Planning, Development, Review/Revision, Approval, and Establishment of the IAEA Safety Standards MANSYS. Review with the SSCs the structure of the Safety Standards Committees to prepare for the next term (*ref. Item 1.5*) **[Action: Secretariat, SSCs and CSS members]** Being done in the revision 0.2 of MANSYS that was reported under agenda item 3.9; review of structure of Safety Standards on the agenda of the meeting of the 5 chairs on 3 September 2008.

23.3. Prepare a draft updated generic text on the IAEA Safety Standards that addressed the recent developments on the long-term structure of Safety Standards. Include also considerations on the aim of the Safety Standards (best practices, the practices 'necessary and sufficient' to achieve safety, etc.) in the revised text as well as in the above mentioned revision of the MANSYS Document (*ref. Item 1.5*) **[Action: Secretariat, SSCs and CSS members**] Done, generic text discussed under agenda item 3.3.

23.4. Submit to the SSCs for comment an update of the Safety Standards management system MANSYSS and report to the 25th CSS meeting. A presentation on the MANSYSS will be provided during the 24th CSS meeting (*ref. Item 1.5*) **[Action: Secretariat]** Revision 0.2 being prepared. Status report under agenda item 3.9.

23.5. Reconsider, with the involvement of the Chair of the SSCs, the long-term list of Safety Guides, using input from the SSCs and the CSS, and present the revised list as well as the methodology, rationale, prioritization, and justification for such revised list to the SSCs and the CSS, using a visual aid such as a matrix layout (*ref. Item 1.5*) **[Action: Secretariat]** A list was prepared and made available in August 2008. It was reviewed at the meeting of the Chairs on September 5.

23.6. Provide the CSS with information on findings, recommendations, and best practices including both safety and security from the IRRS missions (*ref. Item 2.1*) **[Action: Secretariat and ADSec Chair]** This was addressed under agenda item 2.2 (ADSec) and 3.7 (overall feedback mechanisms).

23.7. Inform the CSS members on the availability of the report from the Commission of Eminent Persons (*ref. Item 2.3*) **[Action: Secretariat]** Message sent to the CSS members and report from the CEP posted for information on the CSS web site. A presentation was done under agenda item 2.1.

23.8. Involve in the preparation of Safety Standards on emergency preparedness and response experts from relevant competent authorities. Consideration may be given in the future to the formation of an ad hoc group to support emergent work but do not initiate efforts to establish a new Safety Standards Committee at this time. (*ref. Item 2.4*) **[Action: Secretariat]** Day to day activities. A paper will be presented in the future on the formation of an ad-hoc group.

23.9. Establish a working group consisting of the Chair of the SSCs and the Secretariat to develop a new Safety Glossary, using as a basis the existing Safety Glossary and new definitions from the BSS, still tracking the historical development of definitions. The review and revision of the Safety Glossary will be processed through the Safety Standards Committees and then submitted for CSS review and approval. (*ref. Item 2.8*) **[Action: Secretariat]** This was discussed at the meeting of the 5 Chairs on September 2 and under agenda item 3.8.

23.10. After agreement on the content has been reached with the co-sponsors, implement the new format and style in the current revision of the BSS (DS379), in close consultation with the co-sponsors and before its final submission to the Committees and the CSS for approval (*ref. Item 2.8*) **[Action: Secretariat]** A plan was presented under agenda item 2.3.

23.11. Send to the IAEA DG a letter of information setting out the policy on the long-term structure of the Safety Standards and the main topics (updated list of priority items from the CSS Chairman's report of the last 4-year term) that will be addressed by the 4th term of the CSS. A copy of the letter to be provided to the INSAG Chair (*ref. Item 3.1*) **[Action: CSS Chairman with CSS members]** Letter sent to the DG on July 2, sent to all CSS participants and posted on the CSS web site.

23.12. Amend Item 6 of the draft roadmap to read: "Safety measures and security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner", and include amendments for clarification to the annexes as provided by USA. The approved roadmap to be distributed to the SSCs, the CSS and the BSS cosponsors (*ref. Item 3.3*) **[Action: Secretariat]** Done in the final approved version of the roadmap. Dated 23 May 2008.

23.13. Submit the revision of TS-R-1 (DS345) to the CSS Chair for final approval before its submission to the Board of Governors; Recommendation to submit to the Board of Governors the full text of the revision of TS-R-1 instead of the table of changes (*ref. Item 6.*1) **[Action: Secretariat]** Final text of TS-R-1 reviewed by the TRANSSC Chair and agreement of the CSS chair to submit it to the BOG. Internal request from PMO to submit the table of changes.

23.14. Present for information to the 24th CSS meeting the DPPs of Safety Guides on Radiation Safety in Well Logging (DS419) and on Radiation Safety for Nuclear Gauges (DS420), completed to incorporate security recommendations. The provisions in the Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources should be a relevant source of information for the safety and security considerations. (*ref. Items 6.10 and 6.11*) **[Action: Secretariat]** Revised DPP posted on the CSS web site and to be presented under agenda item 5.8.

23.15. Study and submit to the SSCs two options for the presentation of recommendations for technical support organizations: integrated into the revision of GS-G-1.1; or as a separate Safety Guide (*ref. Item 6.14*) **[Action: Secretariat]** A paper on the TSO for regulatory body has been posted to the SSCs for review and advice on whether this should be a separate guide or this should be included into the revision of GS-G-1.1.

23.16. Include in the Safety Guide on Periodic Safety Review of Nuclear Power Plants, revision of NS-G-2.10 (DS426) a recommendation that insights from the reviews be treated as Operational Experience feedback and that this information be shared internationally; include WASSC and RASSC in the review of DS426 (*ref. Item 6.15*) **[Action: Secretariat]** Done.

23.17. Prepare the draft report of the CSS 23rd meeting to be submitted for approval at the 24th CSS (*ref. Item 7*) **[Action: Secretariat]** Draft report posted for CSS comments on 2 July 2008.

23.18. Include in the Status document DPPs that have already been approved by the Steering Committee (*ref. meeting of the Chairs*) **[Action: Secretariat]** Done. One DPP so far approved by the Steering Committee mentioned in the revision of the status document.

23.19. Circulate items for discussion in advance of the 'meeting of the Chairs' (*ref. meeting of the Chairs*) **[Action: Secretariat]** Consultation started in August 2008 and items for discussion established jointly with the 5 Chairs.

23.20. Address at each CSS meeting, in addition to the Standards, one major safety related topic (*ref. meeting of the Chairs*) **[Action: CSS Chair and Secretariat]** Overall discussion on the feedback mechanisms and feedback from IRRS took place during the 24th CSS meeting under agenda item 3.7.

ANNEX V

GENERIC TEXT FOR PRELIMINARY PAGES, SAFETY STANDARDS SERIES

(Approved by the Commission on 09/10/2008)

THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

BACKGROUND

Radioactivity is a natural phenomenon and natural sources of radiation are features of the environment. Radiation and radioactive substances have many beneficial applications, ranging from power generation to uses in medicine, industry and agriculture. The radiation risks to workers and the public and to the environment that may arise from these applications have to be assessed and, if necessary, controlled.

Activities such as the medical uses of radiation, the operation of nuclear installations, the production, transport and use of radioactive material, and the management of radioactive waste must therefore be subject to standards of safety.

Regulating safety is a national responsibility. However, radiation risks may transcend national borders, and international cooperation serves to promote and enhance safety globally by exchanging experience and by improving capabilities to control hazards, to prevent accidents, to respond to emergencies and to mitigate any harmful consequences.

States have an obligation of diligence and duty of care and are expected to fulfil their national and international undertakings and obligations.

International safety standards provide support for States in meeting their obligations under general principles of international law, such as those relating to environmental protection. International safety standards also promote and assure confidence in safety and facilitate international commerce and trade.

A global nuclear safety regime is in place and is being continuously improved. IAEA safety standards, which support the implementation of binding international instruments and national safety infrastructures, are a cornerstone of this global regime. The IAEA safety standards constitute a useful tool for contracting parties to assess their performance under these international conventions.

THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

The status of the IAEA safety standards derives from the IAEA's Statute, which authorizes the IAEA to establish or adopt, in consultation and, where appropriate, in collaboration with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned, standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property and to provide for their application.

With a view to ensuring the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation, the IAEA safety standards establish fundamental safety principles, requirements and measures to control the radiation exposure of people and the release of radioactive material to the environment, to restrict the likelihood of events that might lead to a loss of control over a nuclear reactor core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source or any other source of radiation and to mitigate the consequences of such events if they were to occur. The standards apply to facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks, including nuclear installations, the use of radiation and radioactive sources, the transport of radioactive material and the management of radioactive waste.

Safety measures and security measures[2] have in common the aim of protecting human life and health and the environment. Safety measures and security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner so that security measures do not compromise safety and safety measures do not compromise security.

The IAEA safety standards reflect an international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. They are issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series, which has three categories (see Fig. 1):

Safety Fundamentals

The Safety Fundamentals SF-1 presents the fundamental safety objective and principles of protection and safety and provides the basis for the safety requirements.

Safety Requirements

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[2] See also publications issued in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series

An integrated and consistent set of Safety Requirements establish the requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and the environment, both now and in the future. The requirements are governed by the objective and principles of the Safety Fundamentals. If the requirements are not met, measures must be taken to reach or restore the required level of safety. The format and style of the requirements facilitate their use for the establishment, in a harmonized manner, of a national regulatory framework. The safety requirements use 'shall' statements with statements of associated conditions to be met. Many requirements are not addressed to a specific party, the implication being that the appropriate parties are responsible for fulfilling them.

Safety Guides

Safety Guides provide recommendations and guidance on how to comply with the safety requirements, indicating an international consensus that it is necessary to take the measures recommended (or equivalent alternative measures). The Safety Guides present international good practices, and increasingly they reflect best practices, to help users striving to achieve high levels of safety. The recommendations provided in Safety Guides are expressed as 'should' statements.



FIG. 1. The long term structure for the IAEA Safety Standards Series.

APPLICATION OF THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

The principal users of safety standards in IAEA Member States are regulatory bodies and other relevant national authorities. The IAEA safety standards are also used by cosponsoring organizations and by many organizations that design, construct and operate nuclear facilities, as well as organizations involved in the use of radiation and radioactive sources.

The IAEA safety standards are applicable, as relevant, throughout the entire lifetime of all facilities and activities — existing and new — utilized for peaceful purposes and to protective actions to reduce existing radiation risks. They can be used by States as a reference for their national regulations in respect of facilities and activities.

The IAEA's Statute makes the safety standards binding on the IAEA in relation to its own operations and also on States in relation to IAEA assisted operations.

The IAEA safety standards also form the basis for the IAEA's safety review services, and they are used by the IAEA in support of competence building, including developing educational curricula and training courses.

International conventions contain requirements similar to those in the IAEA safety standards and make them binding on contracting parties. The IAEA safety standards, supplemented by international conventions, industry standards and detailed national requirements, establish a consistent basis for protecting people and the environment. There will also be some special aspects of safety that need to be assessed at the national level. For example, many of the IAEA safety standards, particularly those addressing aspects of safety in planning or design, are intended to apply primarily to new facilities and activities. The requirements established in the IAEA safety standards might not be fully met at some existing facilities that were built to earlier standards. The way in which IAEA safety standards are to be applied to such facilities is a decision for individual States.

The scientific considerations underlying the IAEA safety standards provide an objective basis for decisions concerning safety; however, decision makers must also make informed judgements and must determine how best to balance the benefits of an action or an activity against the associated radiation risks and any other detrimental impacts to which it gives rise.

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS FOR THE IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

The preparation and review of the safety standards involves the IAEA Secretariat and four safety standards committees for safety in the areas of nuclear safety (NUSSC), radiation safety (RASSC), the safety of radioactive waste (WASSC) and the safe transport of radioactive material (TRANSSC), and a Commission on Safety Standards (CSS), which oversees the IAEA safety standards programme (see Fig. 2).

All IAEA Member States may nominate experts for the safety standards committees and may provide comments on draft standards. The membership of the CSS is appointed by the Director General and includes senior governmental officials having responsibility for establishing national standards.

A management system has been established for the processes of planning, developing, reviewing, revising and establishing the IAEA safety standards. It articulates the mandate of the IAEA, the vision on the future application of the safety standards, policies and strategies, and corresponding functions and responsibilities.



FIG. 2. The process for developing a new safety standard or revising an existing standard.

INTERACTION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The findings of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) and the recommendations of international expert bodies, notably the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), are taken into account in developing the IAEA safety standards. Some safety standards are developed in cooperation with other bodies in the United Nations system or other specialized agencies, including the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Environment Programme, the International Labour Organization, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, the Pan American Health Organization and the World Health Organization.

INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT

Safety related terms are to be understood as defined in the IAEA Safety Glossary (http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/safety-glossary.htm). Otherwise, words are used with the spellings and meanings assigned to them in the latest edition of The Concise Oxford Dictionary. For Safety Guides, the English version of the text is the authoritative version.

The background and context of each standard in the IAEA Safety Standards series and its objective, scope and structure are explained in Section 1, Introduction, of each publication.

Material for which there is no appropriate place in the body text (e.g. material that is subsidiary to or separate from the body text, is included in support of statements in the main text, or describes methods of calculation, procedures or limits and conditions) may be presented in appendices or annexes.

An appendix, if included, is considered to form an integral part of the safety standard. Material in an appendix has the same status as the main text, and the IAEA assumes authorship of it. Annexes and footnotes to the main text, if included, are used to provide practical examples or additional information or explanation. Annexes and footnotes are not integral parts of the main text. Annex material published by the IAEA is not necessarily issued under its authorship; material under other authorship may be presented in annexes to the safety standards. Extraneous material presented in annexes is excerpted and adapted as necessary to be generally useful.

ANNEX VI

Long-term structure and format of Safety Requirements

Rev. 6 (05/09/2008) approved at the 24th CSS meeting

The objective of this paper is to present in a single document important aspects already addressed in several previous documents and in particular the approved 23 May 2008 CSS roadmap on the long-term structure of Safety Standards and the CSS Sub-group report part-A issued on 8 February 2007.

A- Structure of safety requirements

Background - Extracts from the CSS roadmap and option discussed within the CSS task-force:

"4) There is now a unique opportunity to draw the inferences from the publication of the single set of Safety Fundamentals and use a combination of a top-down approach and a Requirements gap analysis for the identification of the most efficient and effective structure for the set of Requirements needed to ensure their implementation. The long-term structure should keep the current hierarchy with three level[3]s and take into account the need for stability in regulatory approaches.

5) The intention is to establish a General Safety Requirements integrating all thematic areas in a coherent and harmonized set of publications, complemented by a series of facilities and activities specific Safety Requirements. The complete set of Safety Requirements should address all radiation exposure situations (actual and potential). The General Safety Requirements should apply to any facility/activity (as defined in the footnote of the paragraph 1.9 of the Fundamental Safety Principles SF-1), whereas the others should apply to specific facilities/activities.

11) The BSS is being revised. The result will be a key element among the thematic requirements. It will integrate the new ICRP recommendations. The revision of the BSS should be pursued according to the approved DPP. The possibility of further extending its scope in a second step should be considered so that it can serve as the basis for the future General Safety Requirements. Like for the revision of the BSS, it will involve close consultation of, and collaboration with co-sponsoring organizations about the relationship between the revised BSS and the General Safety Requirements."

6) Safety measures and security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner.

At its September 2007 meeting, the CSS task force concluded that the possibility of further extending the scope of the revised BSS in a second step after its finalization, such that it would serve as the basis for the General Safety Requirements (GSR), was a practical option for the building of the General Safety Requirements. The concept was to construct the future GSR from the requirements on radiation protection and on the safety of radiation sources fully addressed by the revised BSS and, for the other

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[3] Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides

thematic areas, from the additional requirements in GS-R-1, GS-R-2, GS-R-3, WS-R-5, DS348 and DS353, or their revision as appropriate.

Structure of the safety requirements:

As a result of the above general criteria, the long-term set of Safety Requirements would include a General Safety Requirements applicable to all facilities and activities with a graded approach and composed of a set of publications addressing the following eight themes: Governmental and Regulatory framework, Leadership and Management for Safety, Radiation Protection, Safety Assessment, Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste, Decommissioning and Termination of Activities, Emergency Preparedness and Response, and Remediation. It will be complemented by a set of Facilities and Activities Specific Requirements.

In terms of set of publications, considering the interactions of the revised BSS with the other themes and the coverage within the revised BSS of the safety of facilities and activities other than nuclear facilities and activities[4], the following set of publications is envisaged with a General Safety Requirements composed of seven volumes:

Vol.1- Governmental and Regulatory framework (on-going revision of GS-R-1, DS415)

Vol.2- Leadership and Management for Safety (future revision of GS-R-3)

Vol.3- Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources (on-going revision of the BSS, DS379)

Vol.4- Safety Assessment (DS348 or its future revision)

Vol.5- Radioactive Waste Management (revision of WS-R-2, DS353 approved by the CSS for submission to the BoG)

Vol.6- Decommissioning and Termination of Activities (future revision of WS-R-5)

Vol.7- Emergency Preparedness and Response (future revision of GS-R-2)

The existing WS-R-3 on remediation will be included in the section of the revised BSS on existing exposure situations. The future revision of GS-R-2 will focus on the management of emergency preparedness and response activities and refer to the revised BSS for the criteria and radiation

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[4] **Nuclear Facilities and Activities are:**

- nuclear installations : nuclear power plants, research reactor facilities (including subcritical and critical assemblies), spent fuel storage facilities, nuclear fuel fabrication facilities, conversion facilities, enrichment facilities or reprocessing facilities

- waste management facilities and activities, associated with nuclear installations, including decommissioning but excluding discharges to the environment

- facilities and activities for research and development associated with nuclear installations

- any other facilities and activities in which nuclear material and radioactive material are produced, processed, used, handled, stored or disposed of on such a scale that consideration of nuclear safety is required

protection issues. The revised BSS would keep its self-standing character with adequate references to other thematic areas.

This will be complemented by a set of six Facilities and Activities specific Safety Requirements:

- Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations (future revision of NS-R-3)

- Safety of Nuclear Power Plants with one volume on design and construction (on-going revision of NS-R-1, DS414) and one volume on commissioning and operation of Nuclear Power Plants (on going revision of NS-R-2, DS413)

- Safety of Research Reactors (future revision of NS-R-4)

- Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities (DS316 and its future revision)

- Safety of Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities (on going revision of WS-R-1 and WS-R-4, DS354)

- Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (on going revision of TS-R-1, DS345)

Through their development, practical means of ensuring the implementation of the item 6 of the roadmap on safety and security will be investigated and implemented.



B- Definition and format for safety requirements

<u>Background - Extracts from the CSS roadmap Annex B and the CSS Sub-group report part-A:</u>

As indicated in the CSS Subgroup report part A, it is proposed to adopt for all Safety Requirements a format similar to the one used for the Fundamental Safety Principles with a discrete set of

requirements followed by explanatory text, as necessary. When a compelling justification drives changes to a Safety Requirement the revision should include the adoption of this new format. The status of the explanatory text and the expectations for its use will be made clear. It is also expected that the level of detail in each chapter will be similar (annex IV of the CSS subgroup report par A elaborates on a better definition of the level of the Safety Requirements with some examples). The main reasons are as follows:

- *In term of user-friendliness, the format and style of the Safety Standards should facilitate their use for the establishment of the regulatory framework (see annex A to the roadmap on user-friendliness). The Safety Requirements should be short enough to encourage their reading and actual use in the Member States;*
- *In the current set of Safety Requirements, references are often made to specific concepts but their explanation is given in many cases in the subsequent Safety Guides. In the future, it is expected that the explanation of the concepts will be provided in the Safety Requirements so as to facilitate their interpretation for use in establishing national regulatory requirements. The purpose of the Safety Guides will not be to explain these concepts but to focus on the recommendations on how the requirements can be implemented;*
- *In addition, each individual discrete requirement will be allocated a number which, by appropriate references in the Safety Guides, will help building a logical relationship between the set of safety requirements and the set of safety guides. Thus, after completion of the set of Safety Requirements, the subsequent revision of Safety Guides will refer to these numbers; and*
- *Requirements must address what must be achieved/done while the guides will address how this could be achieved/done.*

With regards to the definition of the safety requirements the CSS Sub-group report part-A presented the overall definition of safety requirements and elaborated on this definition in its Annex IV.

<u>Definition and format for safety requirements:</u>

The overall definition for the future requirements would generally be maintained. It should be slightly modified as not all sentences would be established as shall statements. The revised definition would thus be as follows:

"Safety Requirements publications establish the requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and the environment, both now and in the future. The requirements are governed by the objectives and principles of the Safety Fundamentals. If they are not met, measures must be taken to reach or restore the required level of safety. Their format and style facilitate their use by Member States for the establishment, in a harmonized manner, of their national regulatory framework."

The annex IV of the CSS Sub-group report part A is also slightly updated, particularly for the examples, which were extracted from existing requirements and are not expressed with the new format. These examples have been re-written with the new format with a view to also serving as guidance for the drafters.

The type one requirements described in the annex will be established as overarching discrete requirements expressed as "shall" statement and be allocated a discrete number. They should be written in plain language, with clear and short sentences. The conditions associated with the

overarching requirements described as type two requirements in the annex will be established as present tense sentences below the overarching requirements and will be considered as an integral part of the safety requirements.

ANNEX : Detailed definition of the Safety Requirements

Types of requirements	Examples
1.Overarching requirements A requirement to do or not to do something A requirement to establish a body, a process, a program or to allocate a responsibility. It indicates *who* shall do or establish *what* and, as appropriate, *when*	A regulatory body shall be established. A program for monitoring individual occupational exposure of workers shall be established. The operating organization shall prepare and implement a program of maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection of … The operating organization shall establish and implement a programme to ensure that, in all operational states, doses due to exposure to ionising radiation in the plant or due to any planned releases of radioactive material from the plant are kept below prescribed limits and as low as reasonably achievable.
2.Conditions associated with the overarching requirements Set of requirements on the main features of the process or program to be established according to the above category 1 requirement: This includes the scope of the process or program in terms of what it shall consider, include or cover, Requirements related to the main safety strategy that shall be adopted, Requirements related to the organizational aspects to be considered and, where appropriate the interaction among different organizations or bodies, and where appropriate steps of the process or program. This also include Requirements related to the evaluation/assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of the program/processes	This program is in place prior to the fuel loading and takes into account operational limits and condition The program for monitoring of the workplace specifies the quantities to be measured, when and where the measurements are to be made, measurements methods and procedures, reference levels and action to be taken if they are exceeded. Boundaries of controlled areas are based on the magnitude of expected normal exposure and the likelihood and magnitude of potential exposure. The (radiation protection) program covers: - classification of areas and access control, including local information on actual dose rates and contamination levels; - instruments and equipment for monitoring; - equipment for personnel protection … The program of maintenance, testing … includes periodic inspections or tests of systems, structures and components important to safety. In determining the site characteristics that are important to the assessment of the design and safety of near surface disposal facilities, the following is considered as a minimum: geology, hydrogeology, geochemistry, tectonic and seismicity, surface processes, meteorology, climate and impact of human activities. The controlled areas are delineated by physical means. The monitoring of workers occupational exposure is based on individual monitoring.

	A radiation protection officer is designated The tasks and responsibilities of different organizational units and persons in outages is clearly defined in writing. The monitoring program is regularly assessed. The program for maintenance, testing, … is re-evaluated in the light of experience.

ANNEX VII

Criteria for the long-term set of safety guides

Rev. 6 (05/09/2008) approved at the 24th CSS meeting

As indicated in the 23 May 2008 CSS roadmap on the long-term structure of safety standards, "*The future collection of Safety Standards should [also] be manageable and therefore consist of a manageable number of publications each of them being as concise as possible and addressing the essence of the safety issues.*"

The annex C of the roadmap on the strategy for the work on the safety guides indicates that *"separate consideration will be given to the revision of existing guides and to the proposal of new guides"*. The annex C presents the criteria for the addition of new guides. These are developed in the part B here below. Therefore, the purpose of the part A of this paper is to complement the criteria with those applicable to the optimization of the current set of existing or planned safety guides.

A- Criteria for the optimization of the current set of safety guides

- An indication of the reasonable total number of safety standards: around 80 to 100.

- The overall picture is a matrix picture (not a tree structure with a set of safety guide below individual requirements as this is the case is the current structure). A matrix structure allows for safety guides implementing several requirements and thus allows for the optimization of the whole set of guides.

- Safety Guides in the general safety area should be generic for all facilities and activities. As a objective in principal, there should be one safety guide for each important theme (the eight themes are Governmental and Regulatory framework, Leadership and Management for Safety, Radiation Protection, Safety Assessment, Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste, Decommissioning and Termination of Activities, Emergency Preparedness and Response, and Remediation) unless a justification is provided that the importance of the differences between the recommendations for some facilities and activities lead to the preparation of a separate guide for these facilities or activities, or a justification is provided that combining two may topics related to a single theme would not be practicable

- For the facility and activities specific guides, the overall approach is as follows:

  - for fuel cycle facilities, waste disposal facilities and radiation related facilities and activities, the preferred approach is to have "vertical guides" integrating the necessary guidance material on all topics and for each type of facility or activity (user approach). Topics that are common to many users should be developed as modules to be incorporated in the specific guides. When however a module is too large to be incorporated in the specific guides, it may be envisaged to prepare one guide on this topic.

  - for the transport activities there is a general safety guide (TS-G-1.1) complemented by a few other guides with a reasonable overall number.

  - for the nuclear installations, the approach is an horizontal approach with topic specific safety guides. Nevertheless, when the recommendations on these topics can be applicable to NPPs,

RRs and FCF, a common SG would be prepared, possibly with a graded approach for its implementation for the different types of installations. When it is justify not to combine the guides for NPPs, RRs an FCFs, the preference would still be given to try integrating the guides for NPPs and RRs. If justified we could end up with three guides for one topic, one for the NPPs, one for the RRs and one for FCFs.

- moreover, for the nuclear reactors, there may be different ways of combining the safety guides: A vertical way, like integrating as far as possible what relates to the site, integrating as far as possible what relates to the design and integrating as far as possible what relates to the operation. This will be the preferred approach because it corresponds to giving recommendations for actual activities at a specific time and because the expertise needed for siting, design and operation is different. The necessary cross-reference should however be made to prevent an artificial separation of design and operation.

A example of a matrix is attached with a view to illustrating the overall approach for the optimization of the set of safety guides. At the top of the matrix, the different users in terms of facilities and activities are indicated. The Standards applicable to them are the one vertically below their identification. Of course the general safety requirements apply, their specific safety requirements, the generic guides and finally the set of specific guides.

B- Criteria for the addition of new safety guides

The need for additional topics to be addressed in Safety Guides should be justified by a gap identification. The justification should consider which Safety Requirements the proposed additions relates to and present the overall coverage (scope and issues addressed) of the current set of Safety Guides implementing these requirements.

The status of these existing safety guides should be reviewed with a view to indicating the time-frame expected for their next revision. In most cases, it will be possible to address the additional need by expanded the scope of an existing guide at its next revision or through the production of addendum pages.

Therefore, once the result of a gap analysis identify that there is a gap to be filled, a proposal for the establishment of a new Safety Guide in the whole collection, together the DPP will be considered only if there is a justification for an urgent need and either:

1- This need cannot be achieved by expanding the scope of an existing Safety Guide[5]; or

2- This need could be addressed by expanding the scope of an existing Safety Guide, but it is not expected to revise this Guide sufficiently soon to address the urgent need[6]. In this case, the Special

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[5] An example is DS424 on establishing nuclear installations safety infrastructure. There is an urgent need; it doesn't fit in any existing guide.

[6] An example is DS416 on licensing process. There is an urgent need. It could be integrated into the proposed guide on functions of the regulatory body but it is not expected to revise this one very soon. It is therefore acceptable to develop

DPP will contain an additional line in the production section indicating to which Safety Guide the material will be later integrated and the related target date for integration so as to maintain as far as possible the initial closed set of Safety Guides.

The prioritization of proposals for new safety guides or the revision of existing safety guides should be consistent with the main topics identified as priorities by the CSS, at the beginning of each term.

Moreover, throughout the review or any proposal, account should be taken that safety measures and security measures musts be designed and implemented in an integrated manner.

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a separate guide as a temporary solution. The new guide will later one be integrated into the future guide on functions of the regulatory bodies.

ANNEX VIII

Document Preparation Profile (DPP)

Version 5 (05/09/2008) approved for the safety standards at the 24th CSS meeting

1. IDENTIFICATION

Document Category	**[Safety Requirement, Guide, Security, Safety Report, TECDOC, others (specify)]**
Working ID:	**[leave blank]**
Proposed Title:	**[proposed full title of document]**
Proposed Action:	**[new document, revision of document, combining of documents]**
Published Title/Date	**[provide if existing document, otherwise leave blank]**
Safety Series No.:	**[provide if existing document; otherwise leave blank]**
SS Committee(s):	**[if applicable, relevant committee(s), with lead committee identified first; otherwise leave blank]**
Technical Officer(s):	**[name of officers, with lead officer identified first]**

2. BACKGROUND

(Describe, for a new proposed publication, the rationale for the need to cover an additional topic not yet addressed by existing publications, as identified through a gap analysis. For the revision of an existing publication, describe briefly the previous publication, the experience feedback from its use including feedback from Member States and IAEA services, and the background on why new elements needs to be addressed)

3. OBJECTIVE AND JUSTIFICATION

(For a new publication, provide a summary of the review of existing publications in terms of current coverage and develop the added value expected for, and impact on the target users of the coverage of the additional topic. Justify in particular that the topic could not be addressed through the revision of an existing publication

For the revision of an existing publication, provide an update of the objectives of the previous publication that includes the new elements).

4. POSITION IN THE OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE RELEVANT SERIES AND INTERFACES WITH EXISTING AND/OR PLANNED PUBLICATIONS

(Identify the position of the document in the overall structure of the relevant series - particularly for the safety standards series - and summarize the relationships between the document and other publications or documents in preparation, as well as any interaction with other organizations)

5. OVERVIEW

(Describe expected content of the document, such as summary of the scope, style, structure, terminology and any other points to take into account when drafting. Attach any detailed information, e.g. outline of chapter heading, extended Table of Contents, etc.)

6. PRODUCTION: Provisional schedule for preparation of the document, outlining expected dates for:

Approval of DPP by the Steering Committee
Approval of DPP by the Safety Standards Committees*

Approval of DPP by the CSS*
Approval of draft by the Steering Committee
Approval by the Safety Standards Committees for submission to Member States for comments*
Approval of the revised draft by the Steering Committee*
Approval by the Safety Standards Committees for submission to the CSS;* Review in NS-SSCS*
Endorsement by the CSS*
Submission to Publications Committee
Approval by the Board of Governors, as appropriate
Target publication date
note: * is necessary only for the Safety Standards.

7. RESSOURCES

Estimated resources involved by the Secretariat and the Member States